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TasmaniaTasmania's forest practices system, one of the most prescriptive globally and the most comprehensive in
Australia, has evolved over the last 25 years in response to public demands for high standards of governance,
accountability and transparency of forest regulation on both public and private lands. The systemwas developed
in the context of strong contestation, in Tasmanian and Australian civil society and politics, about appropriate
forest policies and practices in Tasmania. The system is governed by a Forest Practices Act, which provides for
a co-regulatory approach administered by an independent statutory body, the Forest Practices Authority. All
forest operations must be undertaken in accordance with a certiﬁed forest practices plan, prepared and certiﬁed
by accredited Forest Practices Ofﬁcers employed by forest managers. These co-regulatory components of the
system are supported by independent monitoring and enforcement by the Forest Practices Authority. This
paper describes the genesis and evolution of the Tasmanian forest practices system, and summarises the range
of measures employed to foster high levels of compliance, with an emphasis on training and education,
self-monitoring and reporting by the industry, independent monitoring by the Forest Practices Authority, and
corrective actions, backed by enforcement provisions. Compliance monitoring over 27 years demonstrates
rapid improvement in the decade following establishment of the system,with consistently high levels of achieve-
ment subsequently. However, larger corporate forest managers consistently achieve higher rates of compliance
than do small-scale forest owners, and redressing this imbalance has been a recurrent theme in Tasmania's forest
practices system. Experience of implementation of Tasmania's forest practices system suggests that
well-designed and implemented co-regulatory approaches, with high levels of transparency, can be effective in
delivery of good technical standards of forest practices and high levels of compliance. However, these will not
in themselves mitigate public concern about forest management practices unless the policies governing those
practices have broad support in civil society.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license. 1. Introduction
Forest practices systems – the policy approaches and instruments by
which governments regulate forest management to protect environmen-
tal and other forest values (McDermott et al., 2010, Chapter 1) – are a fun-
damental component of forest governance arrangements (Cashore, 2009;
World Bank, 2009). As Gunningham (2009) describes for environmental
governance more generally, forest practices systems have evolved from
relatively simple approaches predicated on a ‘command and control’Tasmania 7000, Australia. Tel.:
ilkoforest@gmail.com
eld),
.Open access under CC BY-NC-SA licenphilosophy to a more complex and varied architecture, encompassing a
spectrum from traditional regulation to co- and self-regulation, and
drawing on market-based as well as regulatory instruments.
Issues of compliance and enforcement1 are central to the effective-
ness of forest governance regimes (Cashore, 2009; Gunningham,
2009; World Bank, 2009), and are critical to closing the gap between
policy intent and on-ground outcomes in forest management (Christy
et al., 2007). However, assessing effectiveness – both of alternative
governance regimes and of different approaches to compliance and
enforcement – is difﬁcult, reﬂecting the complexity and dynamic nature
of both what is being governed and of the governance arrangements
themselves (Agrawal et al., 2008; Dovers, 2005; Gunningham, 2009),
as well as challenges in deﬁning appropriate assessment criteria and
measures (McDermott et al., 2010). These challenges are exempliﬁed
by recent work to deﬁne indicators of good forest governance (Brito1 Following Dovers (2005), “enforcement” is used here in the context of direct regulato-
ry approaches, and “compliance” in the context of a broader range of approaches.
se. 
2 G.R. Wilkinson et al. / Forest Policy and Economics 40 (2014) 1–11et al., 2009), which identiﬁed a preliminary list of 94 such indicators,
each requiring assessment.
Assessment of effectiveness, in the comprehensive sense above of
assessing the impacts of a regulatory regime in relation to its goals
(see, e.g., discussion in McDermott et al., 2010, Chapter 1), is beyond
the scope of this paper. Rather, the assessment here is limited – because
of data availability – to the compliance and enforcement elements of the
case study regulatory system. This remains an important contribution,
because as Gunningham (2009: 212) notes, “tak[ing] advantage of the
wealth of empirical evidence that has been accumulated” is important
to improving regulatory outcomes, but there are relatively few empiri-
cal studies of the effectiveness of various regulatory approaches in forest
management (Ellefson et al., 2007; McDermott et al., 2010).
This paper contributes to our understanding of forest regulation, and
important elements of its effectiveness, by drawing on data and experi-
ence of compliance and enforcement from 25 years of implementation
of the forest practices system in the Australian state of Tasmania. Tasma-
niawas theﬁrst Australian state, and one of the ﬁrst jurisdictions globally,
to introduce a comprehensive forest practices system (McDermott et al.,
2010); it remains one of only two of the 45 jurisdictions across 20 coun-
tries surveyed byMcDermott et al. (2010) to have a single forest practices
system that applies across all forest tenures and types.
In this paper, we brieﬂy review contemporary approaches to environ-
mental regulation and their expression in forest practices systems; intro-
duce Tasmania's forest practices system; and discuss experience and the
record of compliance and enforcement under the Tasmanian system.
Our perspectives are those of forest practices practitioners in Tasmania
and the Asia-Paciﬁc region (Wilkinson and Schoﬁeld), and of an
academic with interests in forest policy and regulation (Kanowski).
The paper does not address the larger political economy of forestry
in Tasmania, which has been extensively addressed elsewhere (e.g.
Ajani, 2007; Dargavel, 1995; Economist, 2011; Gale, 2008; Kanowski,
2012; Russell et al., 2010), other than to provide context and in respect
of the roles that the entity administering Tasmania's forest practices
system has, or is perceived to have, played in relation to political
decisions regarding forestry.
2. Approaches to environmental and forest governance
and regulation
The modern era of environmental governance is generally associated
with the establishment of the US Environmental Protection Agency in
1970, and comparable initiatives in Europe around the same time
(Gunningham, 2009). Since then, the broad architecture of environmental
law, regulation and governance has changed substantially, fromone of di-
rect ‘command and control’ by the state to various forms of collaborative
governance involving government, private and non-government organi-
sations, an emphasis on ‘outcome-based’ regulation, and the use of
market-based as well as regulatory instruments (Glück et al., 2005;
Gunningham, 2009). Gunningham's (2009) review of environmental
law, regulation and governance suggested that each of these regulatory
approaches has their place, as none of them work well in all situations,
and argued for the use of a range of complementary approaches and
instruments within a ‘regulatory tool-kit’, noting that the effectiveness
of any particular approach is ultimately underpinned by the threat of
sanctions. These conclusions are mirrored in the forest governance
literature (e.g. Cashore, 2009; Glück et al., 2005; World Bank, 2009).
The choice of regulatory approach is determined in part by the
relative costs, beneﬁts and risks of alternatives to both the public and pri-
vate sectors. For example, under-regulation may lead to environmental
harm, and lack of market or social acceptance for forest management
practices. Conversely, over-regulation may not improve environmental
outcomes, may render operations uncommercial and may have the per-
verse outcome of stiﬂing innovation that will improve environmental
outcomes because forest managers adopt a minimalist or a ‘letter of the
law’ approach to compliance (McDermott et al., 2010, Chapter 10).Whilstgovernments generally recognise that both business efﬁciency and
environmental outcomes are hindered rather than helped by excessive
regulation (Industry Commission, 1998), ‘regulatory creep’ nevertheless
remains a common phenomenon. For example, Bennett (2002) reported
that over 900 forestry decrees were issued in Indonesia between 1976
and 1999, leading to forest managers becoming more focused on ofﬁce-
based administrative compliance rather than on improving practices in
the ﬁeld. In California, USA, conﬂict and litigation about forest harvesting
resulted in increasingly prescriptive forest practices rules, which signiﬁ-
cantly increased regulatory costs without necessarily improving environ-
mental outcomes (Gasser, 1996). In Tasmania, the size of the Forest
Practices Code and supporting planning guidelines increased 50-fold
from the ﬁrst issue of the Code in 1987 to its third edition in 2000, signif-
icantly increasing costs as well as enhancing environmental protection
(Wilkinson, 2006).
The success of any environmental regulatory system is determined
by a number of factors, principally the relevance of its prescribed poli-
cies and practices to protecting environmental and other (e.g. cultural)
values, the extent to which these prescriptions are implemented, the
cost of regulation, and the degree to which society and markets have
trust and conﬁdence in the system (see, e.g. Gunningham, 2009;
Hollander, 2006). All of these factors are important to the success of a
forest practices system; as McDermott et al. (2010: 21) observed “the
best crafted forest practice regulations are irrelevant if they are not
observed in practice”.
3. The Tasmanian context
The Australian state of Tasmania is richly forested, with a diversity of
temperate forest ecosystems mirroring the exceptional diversity of the
island's environments. Tasmania's forests range, for example, from the
world's largest eucalypts to the smallest, and from rainforests receiving
more than 3200 mm annual rainfall to dry eucalypt forests receiving
less than 500 mm annually (Harris and Kitchener, 2005; Jackson,
1968). Although an estimated 40% of Tasmania's forests have been
converted to other land uses since European colonisation in 1803
(Tasmanian Public Land Use Commission, 1996), the state remains
proportionally the most highly forested of the Australian states; 50% of
its land area of about 3.4 m ha is forested (FPA, 2012). Nearly 91% of
these forests are native ecosystems; there are also about 314,000 ha of
commercial plantation forests (FPA, 2012).
Around a half of Tasmania's native forests are protected in conserva-
tion reserves: 38% in formal reserves, and 11% in informal reserves that
are excluded from timber harvesting through administrative zoning or
by prescription under the forest practices system (FPA, 2012). The
remaining forests are almost equally divided between those on public
land and those on private freehold land (FPA, 2012). Forest-based indus-
tries have been economically important since European colonisation
(Dargavel, 1995), and have comprised a signiﬁcant share of the state's
economy (4.6% of Gross State Product in 2008 compared to the national
average of 0.7% of Gross Domestic Product; Felmingham and Wadsley,
2008; Montreal Process Implementation Group for Australia, 2008).
Both public and private forests are important for wood production; al-
though public forests have contributed around two-thirds of native forest
harvest volumes in the period 2001–11 (FPA, 2012; Tasmanian and
AustralianGovernments, 2007), the areas of public and private native for-
ests subject to forest operations in any one year are usually comparable,
and the majority of plantation operations are now on private lands
(FPA, 2012). Forest operations in Tasmania are typically undertaken by
forestry contractors, who operate as independent small businesses,
under the direction of the forest owner and subject to the forest practices
system and other relevant legislation.
Management of Tasmania's forests has been contested since Aborig-
inal Tasmanians' resistance to European colonisation (Boyce, 2008;
Dargavel, 1995). In the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, the contest was
largely between professional foresters and the forest industries over
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1995). For much of the last 40 years, coinciding with the larger-scale
and more intensive harvesting of native forests for pulpwood, there
has been strong contestation between the environmental movement,
the forest industries, and forest managers over forest conservation,
forest practices, and forest-based development (Ajani, 2007; Dargavel,
1995; Gale, 2008; Russell et al., 2010). Over the past 15 years, the sub-
stantial expansion of plantation forests on both agricultural and forest
land has been a further focus of strong contestation in the Tasmanian
community (Schirmer, 2009; WWF Australia, 2004).
The Australian federal government exercises only a limited role in
forest policies and practices at the state level (McDermott et al., 2010,
Chapter 8). However, because of the high degree of contest over Tasma-
nian forest policies and management since the 1980s, the Australian
government has played a more active role in forest policy in Tasmania
than in other Australian state. In particular, the Tasmanian Regional
Forest Agreement 1997 andTasmanianCommunity Forestry Agreement
2005, between the Australian and Tasmanian governments, have
shaped recent Tasmanian forest policy (McDermott et al., 2010). Both
governments have supported themore recent negotiation of a Tasmani-
an Forests Agreement,which is expected to reduce the area of public na-
tive forest available for timber harvesting and the volume of native
forest sawlog harvested by half (Australian Government, 2011).
It is in these contexts that Tasmania's forest practices system was
developed and has evolved since its introduction in 1985. Despite the
subsequent extensive involvement of the Australian Government in
Tasmanian forest policy, the forest practices systemhas remained solely
the responsibility of Tasmania.4. Tasmania's forest practices system
Tasmania's Forest Practices Act 1985 (Parliament of Tasmania, 1985)
had its genesis in the 1970swhen public attitudes to forestry operations
were largely ambivalent or supportive, and prior to the environmental
activism that has subsequently strongly inﬂuenced Australian forest
policy (Ajani, 2007; Dargavel, 1995). At that time, the pressure for
regulation came primarily from foresters in both the public and private
sectors. They were particularly concerned about poor regeneration and
unsustainable forest practices on private land following the widespread
introduction of more intensive harvesting regimes associated with the
development of a native forest-based woodchip export industry in
1972 (Rolley, 1994). This industry created signiﬁcant silvicultural and
economic opportunities for better long-term forest management, by
providing ready markets for previously non-commercial trees and
residues from sawlog harvesting. However, it also provided an opportu-
nity for landowners to either convert their forests to other land uses or
to simply to ‘log and leave’ forests, in an unmanaged and often degraded
condition. These problems were identiﬁed by a 1977 inquiry into
private forestry in Tasmania (Everett and Gentle, 1977), which recom-
mended the development of a regulatory system to encourage sustain-
able forest management across all tenures.
Thus, the objective of the Tasmanian forest practices system is to
‘achieve sustainable management of Crown [public] and private forests
with due care for the environment… in a way that is as far as possible
self-funding’ (Parliament of Tasmania, 1985; Forest Practices Act 1985,
Schedule 7). The system operates primarily through the provisions of
the Forest Practices Act (the Act) and the associated Forest Practices
Code (the Code), under the oversight of what is now an independent
statutory body, the Forest Practices Authority (FPA). The forest practices
system is based on a co-regulatory approach, involving responsible self-
management by the forest industry, and monitoring, enforcement and
public reporting by the FPA (FPA, 2012). The system emphasizes a part-
nership approach between government and the forest industry as the
basis for both regulatory compliance and the continuous improvement
of forest practices (Parliament of Tasmania, 1985). It has therefore beencharacterised as a ‘light-handed’ approach to regulation (Hollander,
2006).
A key feature of the co-regulatory system is the training, accredita-
tion and performance monitoring of Forest Practices Ofﬁcers (FPOs)
by the FPA. Under the Act, FPOs are delegated powers and responsibili-
ties to plan, monitor and enforce the Code within the operations under
their control. FPOs are employed or engaged by forest landowners or
managers to prepare Forest Practices Plans (FPPs), which are the princi-
pal means of giving effect to the Code. Forest Practices Plans are
required for all forest practices, which includes the establishment of
forests, the harvesting of timber, the clearing of trees and any associated
construction of roads and quarries, on all land tenures and for both na-
tive and plantation forests. Forest Practices Plans must be prepared and
certiﬁed by an FPO at the coupe or compartment level for all operations;
McIntosh and Ware (2008) present an example of how the Code is
translated into operational speciﬁcations at this level. Although
Tasmania's forest practices system predates the development of forest
certiﬁcation schemes, it provides a framework that delivers many of
the requirements of the two schemes operating in Australia, the PEFC-
accredited Australian Forestry Standard and the FSC (La Sala, 2012),
which currently cover 1.8 million ha (76%) and 33,000 ha (1.4%) of
Tasmania's wood production forests, respectively (FPA, 2012).
Tasmania's forest practices system has been criticised for a number
of reasons, principally relating to the broader legislative and policy
framework within which it operates, and the forest practices allowed
by that framework (e.g. clearfelling, conversion of native forest to tree
plantations, pest animal and plant management; see, amongst many
others, Ajani, 2007; Lindenmayer, 2008; WWF Australia, 2004); to the
potential for conﬂicts of interest for FPOs in their dual forest manage-
ment and regulatory roles; and to inadequate transparency in some
processes (e.g. Hollander, 2006; Russell et al., 2010). Conversely, the
systemwas ranked as one of the twomost prescriptive across the 45 ju-
risdictions assessed by McDermott et al. (2010), and is one of only two
cases in that sample in which the forest practices system is overseen by
a dedicated, independent, forest practices agency. Australia's national
scientiﬁc organisation, CSIRO, similarly rated Tasmania's forest practices
code as the most comprehensive amongst all Australian states and
territories (Smethurst et al., 2012).
5. Structures and processes to promote compliance and
enable enforcement
Regulation has traditionally been based on either the threat of
penalties (the ‘deterrence’ model) or on persuasion and cooperation
(the ‘accommodative’ model) (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). Both ap-
proaches have their strengths and weaknesses and regulatory theory
now focuses onmodels of ‘responsive regulation’ that involve a hierarchy
of graduated responses (Murphy, 2004). One version of this hierarchy is
an ‘enforcement pyramid’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), in which the
regulatory approach is predominantly one of cooperation and persuasion,
followed by progressively tougher sanctions depending upon the serious-
ness of the non-compliance and the responsiveness of the offender.
The approach to forest regulation in Tasmania can be characterised
as such a pyramid of responsive regulation (Fig. 1), inwhich the empha-
sis and primary focus are on achieving high levels of compliance
through training, education and cooperation, with penalties as a last re-
sort (Rolley, 1994). This approach is enunciated and enabled through
the following provisions of the Tasmanian Forest Practices Act 1985 —
1. The administration of the Act by an independent statutory authority
(the FPA) (Part 1A)
2. An emphasis on training and education (Schedule 7)
3. Compliance monitoring and reporting
a. Monitoring and reporting by FPOs (s.25A)
b. Monitoring and reporting by the FPA (Section 4E).
4. Enforcement powers, including—
Fig. 1. The hierarchy of compliance and enforcement provisions under the Tasmanian
Forest Practices Act.
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tion relating to any forest practices (s.40)
b. The issue of notices by FPOs to stop work and/or take prescribed
actions in order to comply with the Act or certiﬁed forest
practices plan (s.41)
c. The issue of ﬁnes by the FPA (s.47B)
d. Prosecution (s.47)withmaximumpenalties of up to 1000 penalty
units per offence (currently one penalty unit = AUD $1302)
e. Revocation of the appointment of an FPO for failing to exercise
due diligence (s.39).
Each of these provisions is discussed below.
5.1. The statutory basis for administration of the Forest Practices Act
When ﬁrst established in 1985, the Tasmanian Forest Practices Act
was administered by the then Forestry Commission, which had broad
responsibilities for the management of state forests and for providing
advice on private forestry. In 1994 the Commission was replaced by
three separate organisations: Forestry Tasmania, a state-owned enter-
prise responsible for the management of state forest; Private Forests
Tasmania, a state agency responsible for advice to private forest owners;
and the Forest Practices Board (FPB), responsible for the administration
of the Forest Practices Act as an ‘independent’ division of Forestry
Tasmania. The board of the FPB comprised two of the directors from
Forestry Tasmania, one director from Private Forests Tasmania, and
the secretary (viz. head) of the state department responsible for envi-
ronmental management and pollution control (the then Department
of Environment and Land Management).
Whilst the FPB was seen within the forestry sector to serve its
purpose in promoting good compliance standards, it was not perceived
in thewider community to be truly independent from the commercial in-
terests of Forestry Tasmania (Tasmanian Public Land Use Commission,
1997). As a result, the Forest Practices Act was amended in 1999 to estab-
lish the FPB as an independent statutory authority. The governancemodel
for the new board of the FPB was based on representation of key stake-
holder bodies, comprising directors appointed by the Minister from
each of Forestry Tasmania, Private Forests Tasmania, local government,
the forest industry, and the department responsible for environmental
management and pollution. However, continuing perceptions about bias2 AUD $1 = USD $0.91 (at 18.7.13).in the representation of stakeholder bodies on the Board (Green, 2004)
led to the board recommending its replacement with a governance
model based on independent directors (Futureye, 2004). The changes
were passed by parliament in 2005 with the creation of the Forest
Practices Authority, a fully independent body at arm's length from both
government and industry, able tomake statutory decisions and to enforce
the Act. The FPA provides advice to the Minister and is required to report
annually to the Tasmanian parliament on the operation of the Act, but it is
not subject to direction or interference from theMinister or other govern-
mental bodies. The FPA is governed by a board of seven directors,
appointed by the Minister under s.4A of the Act to provide expertise in
the following areas: governance and public administration, sustainable
forestmanagement on public and private lands, environmental or natural
resource management, biological science/nature conservation and
community liaison and local government.
The Act requires the FPA to provide annual reports on its monitoring
and enforcement functions, including a report on the standards of forest
practices that are being achieved and the degree of compliancewith the
Act and Forest Practices Code. The FPA's Annual Report is required to be
tabled in Parliament and it is published on the FPA website (www.fpa.
tas.gov.au). The statutory functions of the Authority are funded by
both an annual appropriation by parliament (AUD $1.4 million in
2012), and through prescribed fees on submission of forest practices
plans, from ﬁnes, and from the sale of publications and other services.
These latter sources totalled about AUD $1.2 million in 2009, but
had declined to about AUD $300,000 in 2011 due to a decline in forest
industry activity (FPA, 2012).
The principle of independent regulation is strongly established in
Australia, with a plethora of statutory watchdogs that oversee diverse
ﬁelds of activity (Monash University, 2013). Civil society is ﬁercely
critical of any political interference that appears to undermine the
functioning of these bodies. For example, the Tasmanian Government
incurred signiﬁcant public anger and electoral backlash by removing
the approval of a major forest industry project, a proposed pulp mill in
the Tamar Valley, from the authority of the relevant independent statu-
tory regulator (not, in this case, the FPA) and introducing legislation to
fast-track the approval through Parliament (Gale, 2008).
The FPAdoes have a role in providing advice to theMinister on forest
practices policy under s.4C of the Act, and its advocacy has resulted in
legislative amendments, including improved regulation of land clearing
and plantation establishment, and improved governance, compliance
reporting and enforcement measures (Forest Practices Board, 1995 to
2005; FPA, 2006 to 2012). Similarly, the FPA has used its independent
status to advocate for policy change through representations to the
Minister and parliamentary inquiries (e.g. Legislative Council Select
Committee, 2013; Wilkinson and Duff, 2013). However, the Tasmanian
government has chosen to keep the FPA and its regulatory role at arm's
length from matters of broader forest policy, such as the deliberations
and negotiations that led to the 2005 Tasmanian Community Forest
Agreement (Tasmanian and Australian Governments, 2005) and the
2011 Tasmanian Forest Agreement (Australian Government, 2011).
The evolution of the governance arrangements for the regulation of
forest practices in Tasmania demonstrates the importance to the
credibility of the forest practices system of the regulator both being
independent and being seen to be independent. This is challenging in
two major respects. Firstly, the FPA and its board face the challenge,
common to Ministerially-appointed statutory entities in many jurisdic-
tions, of exercising its independent capacity to act, without fear
of favour, but without being judged by the government to have
overstepped its authority. Secondly, whilst, as described above, the
FPA is now independent of government, there is often a lack of differen-
tiation in the public's mind between the forest policy settings that are
the province of government and the regulation of technical standards
for which the FPA has responsibility. Core elements of Tasmanian forest
policy, such as decisions about the allocation of forested lands to partic-
ular tenures, permissible silvicultural systems, Aboriginal peoples'
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the subject of vigorous public and political debate, and to numerous
inquiries and agreements between the Tasmanian and Australian
governments, over the past four decades (e.g. Ajani, 2007; Australian
Government, 2011).
The lack of differentiation between policy settings and technical
standards in much of the public discourse has led to criticism of the FPA
and its predecessor FPB over contentious forest policy issues, such as
the clearfelling of old growth forests and the conversion of native
forests to plantations, that were outside of the control of the regulator
(Forest Practices Board, 1995 to 2005; Russell et al., 2010). Increasingly,
however, other forest sector actors have recognised the distinction be-
tween policy and regulation, and have lobbied government to ensure
that the role of the FPA as an environmental regulator is not downgraded
or undermined as a result of policy decisions, e.g. those about future levels
of timber harvesting in native forests (Tasmanian Conservation Trust,
2013).
5.2. Training and education
The introduction of the forest practices system in 1985 was accompa-
nied by a major focus on the training of FPOs and the education of land-
owners. The early FPO courses focused on upgrading skills and changing
attitudes away from the primacy of wood production towards a broader
understanding of sustainable management of the forests' natural and
cultural values. Despite some initial trepidation and resistance, most for-
esters and contractors rapidly embraced the new system (FPA, 2007a).
The FPA continues to offer annual training courses for prospective
FPOs, with an average of 24 participants attending each course. The sub-
ject areas cover forest ﬂora, fauna, soils, water, geomorphology, cultural
heritage, visual landscape, silviculture, harvesting, road construction,
ﬁre management, monitoring, enforcement and communication (FPA,
2006 to 2012). The FPA requires FPOs to attend biennial refresher
programmes and regular training courses on new developments to en-
sure that their knowledge remains up to date. The training of forest con-
tractors and forest workers is undertaken by forest companies and
registered industry training organisations, which also provide other
skills training in the sector. Training is an ongoing process because of
normal employee turn-overwithin companies and the need to regularly
update those working within the system.
In 2007 the FPA introduced a system of annual awards to recognise
and encourage good practice— amongst FPOs, contractors, landowners,
forest planners and researchers. Winners are presented with a framed
certiﬁcate at an awards ceremony and their testimonials are described
in Forest Practices News, a regular newsletter published by the FPA
(see www.fpa.tas.gov.au) and widely circulated throughout the
Tasmanian forestry sector. The awards have been very successful in
promoting positive attitudes and pride amongst those working within
the system, as exempliﬁed by the comments of the family ﬁrm of
logging contractors who were one of the 2007 award winners:
It's great for us that we have won this forest practices award. For us, it's
an acknowledgement of the quality of work which we strive to achieve.
Our motto is safety and quality before quantity. Because of this ethos,
we are not just focused on prices and so we don't always offer the most
competitive price. Now, thanks to this award, we can justify our ap-
proach. This will help in maintaining high standards as it will justify
our rates, which are higher than some other contractors. … All our
workers have pride in their work and we work together to achieve the
high standards we are so proud of.
[R & G Bye, quoted in FPA, 2007b.]
Broader education about the forest practices system has been more
readily achieved for major forestry organisations than for the small-
scale landowners who collectively manage the majority of Tasmania's
privately-owned forests. Maintaining high levels of awareness oflegislative requirements is made more challenging by frequent changes
to the forest practices system: for example, there have been 10 major
amendments to the Forest Practices Act in the last 20 years. Major
changes to the system in 2007were accompanied by additional govern-
ment funding for landowner education, as had been the case when the
system was introduced in 1985. In both cases, these programmes were
conducted in collaboration with key stakeholder groups such as the
Country Sawmillers Federation (Forestry Commission, 1993) and the
Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association (Field, 2008), often by
the temporary placement of governmental staff or resources in those or-
ganisations to build internal capacity.
An analysis by Wilkinson (2007) found that a lack of knowledge
about the Act and Code still accounted for 29% of recorded non-
compliances during the period 2000–2006, some 15–20 years after
the introduction of the Act. These results highlight the importance of
maintaining ongoing training and education programmes, particularly
across the private sector, where many small-scale forest owners are
involved with forest operations only on an intermittent basis.
5.3. Compliance monitoring and reporting
5.3.1. Compliance monitoring and reporting by FPOs
The original Forest Practices Act relied upon self-regulation by forest
managers, backed up by the independent monitoring of a sample (10–
15%) of FPPs by the regulator. In practice, this worked comparatively
well for large organisations that employed FPOs, and for which regular
coupe inspections were part of the normal management system. How-
ever, on the smaller independent private property operations, there
was little monitoring outside of the 10–15% sample by the regulator
(see Section 5.3.2 below), and compliance standards were consistently
reported by the FPA and its predecessors to be lower than those for larg-
er organisations (Forest Practices Board, 1995 to 2005). As a result, in
1999, parliament accepted a recommendation from the then FPB to
amend the Act to introduce requirements for compliance reports to be
lodged at the completion of all FPPs. Because of the relatively long
time period of some FPPs, of up to ﬁve years, this requirement was
amended in 2005 to require compliance reports at the end of each dis-
crete operational phase within a FPP (for example, at the end of phases
of road construction, harvesting, reforestation treatments and stocking
surveys). The compliance reports must be prepared by an FPO and
lodged with the FPA within 30 days after the completion of each
phase. The FPA checks the accuracy of compliance reports as part of its
regular assessment program.
The large forestry organisations responded to the new requirements
with a lodgement rate of 87% in 2005, rising to 100% by 2009. The re-
sponse of the small independent private sector was poor, averaging
less than 47% by 2008, and prompting concerns that a failure to lodge
compliance reports may have been indicative of other compliance is-
sues. Consequently, the FPA increasingly used its regulatory powers to
enforce the lodgement of the reports, resulting in a lodgement rate of
99% in 2009 (FPA, 2009). The compliance levels reported by small-
scale operators (85% reported to be “fully compliant” and a further
12% reported with minor non-compliances and no further action re-
quired) are now consistent with the results of the FPA's independent
monitoring assessments (90% reported to be “above sound”; FPA
2010), which are discussed in Section 5.3.2 below.
Regular compliance reporting in itself is a powerful regulatory tool.
Prior to the introduction of mandatory compliance reports, it could be ar-
gued that forest owners could ‘take a risk’ on the basis that therewas only
a 10–15% chance of being assessed by the regulator. The requirement for
all operations to be checked places the onus on the operators to ensure
that their operations are compliant and that all requirements, including
post-harvesting rehabilitation works, are completed in a timely manner.
Concomitantly, it increased compliance costs by up to 20% for those forest
owners whose management system did not already require such moni-
toring (see Table 1). Nevertheless, compliance monitoring and reporting
Table 1
Average regulatory costs for forest owners for timber harvesting and reforestation in Tasmania. (Based on an average 50 ha harvesting unit. Operational costs such as road construction,
logging, haulage and reforestation costs are not included).
Item Native forest operations
(average cost AUD/ha)
Plantation forest operations
(average cost AUD/ha)
Planning costs
1. preparation of a forest practices plan $30 to $200 $20 to $80
2. application fee (covers the cost of assessment of the application by the FPA) $20 to $40 $8 to $22
Implementation costs (marking of boundaries, reserves etc.) $10 to $100+ $10 to $30
Monitoring costs (inspections by an FPO) $10 to $40 $10 to $40
Compliance costs (compliance check and lodgement of report by an FPO) $10 to $40 $5 to $40
Total regulatory costs for forest owner $80 to $420+ $53 to $212
Revenue (royalty payment to forest owner) $700 to $10,000 $1500 to $6000
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an forestry sector, whatever the scale of operation. Collaterally, it also
serves to meet some of the requirements for forest certiﬁcation under
schemes operating in Tasmania.
The ‘self-certiﬁcation’ of compliance presents FPOs with a potential
conﬂict with their employer's interests (Hollander, 2006). Such a
potential conﬂict of interest is similar to those faced by other accredited
professionals who have to certify that their ownworkmeets professional
or industry standards in ﬁelds as diverse as occupational health and
safety, taxation, electrical installations and manufactured products (e.g.
Danforth, 2006; Government of South Australia, 2011; Gunningham,
2002; Murphy, 2004). Public concern about self-certiﬁcation is addressed
under the forest practices system through independent monitoring and
regular public reporting of results by the FPA. Evidence suggests that
the vast majority of FPOs take great pride in their work (FPA, 2008),
and are aware that their reports are randomly checked by the FPA and
of the serious consequences of inaccurate or false reporting. As discussed
in Section 5.4.5 below, the incidence of transgression by FPOs appears to
be very low.
5.3.2. Monitoring and reporting by the FPA
The Act requires the FPA to assess the implementation and effective-
ness of a sample of forest practices plans and to annually report its ﬁnd-
ings to parliament. Implementation or ‘compliance’ monitoring is
annually undertaken through formal procedures (FPA, 2009), and the
ﬁndings are published in the FPA's Annual Report. In general, a stratiﬁed
random sample equivalent to about 10–15% of the FPPs certiﬁed in each
year is assessed, at stages varying from desk-top assessment of new
FPPs to ﬁeld checks of completed.
Results of the FPA's monitoring demonstrate substantial improve-
ment in the standard of implementation of FPPs over the 25 years
since the introduction of the Forest Practices Code (Fig. 2). Less than
half of all operations were rated as ‘sound’ or better in 1985, two yearsFig. 2. Results from the FPA's annual assessment of the average standard of compliancewith fore
to 2012 (25 years after).before the introduction of the Code. This proportion increased to 68%
two years after the Code was introduced and rose steadily to 80% after
six years. Compliance assessed at the level of ‘sound’ or better has
remained within the range of 85–95% over the last 15 years.
As noted above, the standards achieved by small, independent
operators on private property are consistently well below those
achieved on State forest and on the private land operations of the
large industrial companies (Annual Reports: Forest Practices Board,
1995 to 2005; FPA, 2006 to 2012). This is not unexpected; the public
forest manager (Forestry Tasmania) and the larger companies have
greater resources and more staff and FPOs to plan, implement and
monitor their operations. In addition, all operations on State forest
and the majority of operations by the large industrial companies on
private land are conducted under environmental management
systems (predominantly ISO14000; see ISO, 2011) and/or forest
certiﬁcation schemes (predominantly the Australian Standard for
Sustainable Forest Management; see Australian Forestry Standard,
2012). In contrast, smaller private landowners tend to have less ca-
pacity and experience with forestry operations, and they therefore
rely more upon the expertise of the contractors who carry out the
forest practices. Many of these landowners are also reluctant to pay
for regular monitoring by FPOs beyond the compliance inspections
that are legally required at the end of each operational phase
under s.25A of the Act (see Section 5.3.1 above). As a result, the num-
ber of breaches serious enough to warrant a ﬁne are disproportion-
ately higher for the smaller operators; these operations represent
22% of all operations and account for 50% of ﬁnes, compared with
the larger industrial companies (45% of operations and 24% of
ﬁnes) and operations on State forest (33% of operations and 26% of
ﬁnes) (derived from Annual Reports: Forest Practices Authority
2000 to 2012).
The FPA conducts ‘effectiveness monitoring’ to evaluate whether
management prescriptions are achieving good environmental outcomes.st practice plans from1985 (twoyears before the introduction of the Forest Practices Code)
Box 1
Case studies of actions taken by the FPA in relation to breaches of the
Forest Practices Act.
1. Higher level breaches
Case 1— Corrective action
Nature of Breach— Clearing of a streamside reserve (1.2 ha) and
construction of a road and fence adjacent to the stream
Tenure— Private property
Method of detection— detected and reported to the FPA by a For-
est Practices Officer
Cause of breach— lack of knowledge of the legislation
Action taken— The landowner was required to relocate the road
and fence outside of the streamside reserve and to actively reha-
bilitate the riparian zone with native vegetation. The total cost of
the remedial works exceeded $42,000.
Case 2— Fine and corrective actions
Nature of Breach— harvesting encroachment into 7 ha of Forest
Reserve
Tenure— State forest
Method of detection— detected by theState forestmanager during
post-harvest monitoring and reported to the FPA
Cause of breach— human error and equipment malfunction in the
marking of a boundary
Action taken — The State forest manager was fined $25,000,
required to regenerate the area and to set aside an additional
14.5 ha of similar forest in an extended reserve.
Case 3— Fine and corrective actions
Nature of Breach— road constructionwithin a streamside reserve,
causing damage to the stream
Tenure— State forest and Crown Reserve
Method of detection — detected by a Forest Practices Officer
during routine monitoring and reported to the FPA
Cause of breach— serious management deficiencies within the
forestry company
Action taken— The forestry company was fined $50,000 and
required to carry out extensive remedial works at a total cost of
$120,000.
2. Lower level breaches
Case 1— Fine
Nature of Breach— felling three trees beyond the boundary of a
forest practices plan
Tenure— State forest
Method of detection — reported by a Forest Practices Officer
during monitoring
Cause of breach— deliberate felling of trees for firewood
Action taken— the contractor was fined $1,000.
Case 2— Fine
Nature of Breach— construction of a landing not authorised in a
forest practices plan
Tenure— State forest
Method of detection — detected by a Forest Practices Officer
during routine monitoring
Cause of breach— insufficient attention to the requirements of
the forest practices plan
Action taken— the contractor was fined $1000.
Case 3— Fine and corrective action
Nature of Breach — harvesting contrary to the wet weather
closure requirements of the Forest Practices Code
Tenure— private property
Method of detection— detected by the FPA during independent
monitoring
Cause of breach— inadequate supervision of the operation
Action taken— the contractor was fined $2000 and required to
carry out remedial works on the snig tracks and roads.
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staff employed within the FPA in collaboration with other research orga-
nisations and forest managers. The results are reported in publications
(e.g. Koch et al., 2012) and summarised in the FPA's Annual Report.
5.4. Enforcement
5.4.1. The right of FPOs to enter upon any land and to obtain information
relating to any forest practices
Under the Act, FPOs have broad powers to enter any landwhere for-
est practices have been carried out and request information from any
person associated with those practices. Any person who hinders an
FPO or fails to comply with a request for information is guilty of an
offence and may be ﬁned (up to 5 penalty units; currently AUD $650)
or imprisoned for up to three months.
These powers are important for monitoring and investigating poten-
tial breaches. Whilst most landowners are generally cooperative, a small
minority will resort to threats of intimidation or trespass, and it is
necessary that investigating ofﬁcers have appropriate powers and
protection under the Act. In practice, these powers have been rarely
required; in the experience of the senior author, there have only been
four cases in the last 14 years where it has been necessary for the FPA
to enlist the assistance of police in investigations where the alleged
offenders were demonstrating threatening or obstructionist behaviour
towards an investigating FPO.
5.4.2. The issue of notices by FPOs to stop work and/or take prescribed
actions in order to comply with the Act or certiﬁed forest practices plan
FPOs have powers to issue verbal orwritten notices to direct persons
to cease operations or to take any actions necessary to comply with the
provisions of the Act or a certiﬁed forest practices plan. Personswho are
served such a notice have the right of appeal to a tribunal. A failure to
comply with a written notice is an offence under the Act, with signiﬁ-
cant penalties (up to 100 penalty units, currently AUD $13,000).
Where a person fails to comply with a notice, the FPA's Chief Forest
Practices Ofﬁcer may engage a person to carry out the required works
and recover the costs from the offender.
Notices are the ‘front line’ of enforcement activity under the Act. Most
are issued verbally as part of day to day supervision of forestry operations
by FPOs,with about 20–30written notices each year formore seriousmat-
ters (FPA, 2012).Where possible, notices are used to require corrective ac-
tions, such as installing water bars on skid tracks to prevent erosion. With
more serious cases of non-compliance, such as harvesting trees within
areas reserved from harvesting, notices may be issued to stop the activity
pending further investigation and resolution of the offence by way of
ﬁnes or prosecution (see below). Notices may also be used to require
major rehabilitation or offset works, such as the revegetation of cleared
areas or the setting aside of compensatory areas as reserves. The costs of
enforced corrective actions or rehabilitation works, which must be borne
by the operator, are often signiﬁcant (see the case studies in Box 1);
these costs in themselves are likely to provide an effective deterrent.
5.4.3. The issue of ﬁnes by the FPA
The FPA has strong powers to impose ﬁnes of an amount up to twice
the cost of making good any loss or damage or any amount that will
constitute a sanction and deterrent, subject to the maximum penalties
prescribed under the Act (up to 1,000 penalty units, currently AUD
$130,000 per offence). The provision was introduced in 1994 and ﬁrst
used by the FPA in 1999 after it became apparent that the court process
was cumbersome and time-consuming for all concerned, and not
always effective, with several cases lost on minor technicalities
(Forestry Commission, 1993). The ﬁnes are offered as an alternative to
prosecution. The vast majority of offenders opt to pay the prescribed
ﬁne and avoid the more expensive and adversarial nature of a prosecu-
tion. The number of successful prosecutions brought, and of ﬁnes issued
and theirmagnitude, by the FPA are summarised in Fig. 3. The data show
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the forestry sector (FPA, 2006 to 2012).
In determiningwhether or not to dealwith amatter byway of a ﬁne,
the FPA considers factors that include—
• Environmental harm, reparability and public sensitivity
• Intention and degree of co-operation
• Corrective actions taken
• Previous history of the offender.
On average, breaches are found in about 6% of Tasmanian forestry
operations, and about 1% of operations have breaches that are serious
enough to warrant a ﬁne or prosecution (Wilkinson, 2007). Penalties
are seen both by the regulator and many in the industry as a powerful
way to deter would-be offenders and to discourage ‘free-riders’ and
complacency. In the words of one forest manager:
no-one likes being ﬁned but it's good that people do get ﬁned because it
shows that the system has got teeth and that everyone has to apply the
same standards.
[S. Jennings, pers. comm.]
There is also a general presumption that ‘the punishment should ﬁt
the crime’; thus, penalties have been applied in 49% of cases where the
non-compliance was of a deliberate nature, compared with only 12% of
cases where the non-compliance was due to human error or deﬁcien-
cies in knowledge or the management system (data derived from
Wilkinson, 2007).
5.4.4. Prosecution
Prosecution under the Act is generally only used where other forms
of enforcement have failed. Whilst most regulators and offenders will
generally try to avoid the costly, adversarial nature of litigation, it
remains the ultimate forum for regulators in seeking to enforce their
legislation and for defendants who assert their innocence. Unfortunate-
ly, the penalties imposed by courts often fall short of the expectations ofFig. 3. Prosecutions and ﬁnes imposed for offencesthe regulator and the public (Bartel, 2003). For example, in 2006, the
FPA prosecuted a landowner who illegally cleared 20 ha of forest for-
mally classiﬁed as a ‘threatened native vegetation community’. The
landowner pleaded guilty and was ﬁned AUD $3000, a penalty that
the FPA considered to be manifestly inadequate. Maximum penalties
under the Forest Practices Act were subsequently increased by the
Tasmanian Parliament from 150 to 1000 penalty points (currently
equal to AUD $130,000) per offence, with the Minister for Forests argu-
ing that ‘a penalty is necessary to deter persons from causing offences
under the Act’, and that ‘the community will not accept poor standards
of forest practices’ (Green, 2004).
There were no prosecutions initiated for the ﬁrst three years after
the introduction of the Act and Code, when the emphasis was ﬁrmly
placed on training and education. For the next eight years until 1998,
there were 27 complaints laid, with only two-thirds of cases (18)
resulting in successful convictions, and most cases taking several years
to resolve. Since 1999, the FPA has generally only taken prosecution
action where the defendant has refused other compliance measures
such as corrective actions and/or prescribed ﬁnes. Over the last
12 years the number of successful prosecutions has averaged less than
one per year, whilst more than seven cases per year are successfully
resolved through the payment of ﬁnes imposed by the FPA (Fig. 3).
5.4.5. Revocation of the appointment of an FPO for failing to exercise
due diligence
Under the co-regulatory approachof the forest practices system,much
of the responsibility for maintaining high compliance standards falls to
the c. 230 FPOs who are employed within the public and private sectors.
The FPA places a high priority on training, supporting and monitoring
the performance of these ofﬁcers. The vast majority of FPOs maintain
very high professional standards. However, as in any ﬁeld of human per-
formance, there are instances of sub-standard performance due to errors,
deﬁciencies in skills and experience, or inappropriate decision-making.
Any instances of alleged unsatisfactory performance are formally investi-
gated by the FPA and addressed through further training, warnings, ﬁxedunder the Forest Practices Act 1989 to 2012.
3 Following Bernstein (2004, p 18), McDermott (2012) deﬁnes legitimacy as a “collec-
tive audience's shared belief that ‘the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or
appropriate’”.
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plinary actions are reported in the FPA's Annual Report. There were 21
warnings, 24 suspensions and ﬁve revocations of appointment over the
18 year period 1995 to 2012 (Forest Practices Board 1995–2005, FPA,
2006 to 2012), corresponding to an annual average of about 1.2% of
FPOs being subject to formal investigation for performance matters. This
rate appears comparable to those for other administrative and law en-
forcement bodies in Western democracies: for example, an annual rate
of about 2.6% for public sector employees and police in the Australian
state of Queensland (derived from statistics in Crime and Misconduct
Commission, 2012 and Public Service Commission, 2012), and of 1% for
reported misconduct of police ofﬁcers in the USA (Packham, 2011).
6. Causes of poor compliance in environmental
regulation— evidence from Tasmania's forest practices system
There are numerous examples worldwide where well-intentioned
regulatory frameworks have created “a plethora of rules, [but] an ab-
sence of enforceability” (Forsyth, 1998). Reasons for poor enforcement
in environmental management in Australia include inadequate moni-
toring, lack of funding, lack of political will exacerbated by the pressure
of inﬂuential stakeholders, regulatory capture, inadequate legislation,
and inadequate sentencing by the courts (Bartel, 2003; Riddell, 2005).
Wilkinson (2007) analysed 648 investigations of non-compliance
conducted by the Tasmanian FPA over the period 2000–2006, and
attributed the causes of non-compliance to one of the following factors—
1. Deﬁcient management system (accounting for 35% of non-
compliances)
2. Human error (22%)
3. Lack of knowledge or understanding of the legislative requirements
(18%)
4. Lack of knowledge or understanding of the provisions of the Forest
Practices Code or forest practices plan (11%)
5. Intentional (15%).
This analysis showed that 85% of non-compliances were associated
with system deﬁciencies, human error, or lack of knowledge (factors
1–4 above), and only 15% were intentional. On this basis, Wilkinson
(2007) concluded that the biggest gains in compliance standards
would be achieved through more efforts in training, education and im-
proved management systems, but that ‘regulatory teeth’ were also
needed to deal with those who were intentionally non-compliant.
7. Discussion and conclusions
Forest practices systems such as Tasmania's are one expression of
‘next generation’ (sensu Gunningham, 2009) approaches to environmen-
tal regulation, each form of which has strengths and limitations. Prior
assessments of the Tasmanian forest practices system have focused on
its ‘ﬁt’ with governance and regulatory principles (e.g. Hollander, 2006;
Nambiar et al., 2012; Russell et al., 2010); evaluation of the system's
performance on the basis of empirical data has been limited to the annual
reports of the Forest Practices Authority and its precursors.Whilst various
evaluations have been reported for a number of North American forest
practices systems (e.g. Cubbage, 2004; Ellefson et al., 2007; Ice et al.,
2004), this has not generally been the case for Australian jurisdictions.
This paper has sought to begin to address that deﬁciency.
Notwithstanding the context-speciﬁc nature of forest practices sys-
tems (McDermott et al., 2010), the results reported here exhibit many
similarities with those reported elsewhere. For example, both the pattern
and level of forest practices plan compliance in Tasmania (Section 5.3.2)
correspond closely to those reported by Ice et al. (2004: Figure 1) over a
similar period for BestManagement Practice implementation inMontana,
USA, where the progressive improvement in compliance to sustained
high levels was also attributed to education of those engaged in forest
harvesting. Ice et al. (2004) also note continuing public scepticism aboutthe results of auditing andmonitoring of forest practices impacts, despite
an increasing focus and expenditure on more rigorous and scientiﬁcally-
defensible assessments of forest practice impacts.
Such ﬁndings emphasise that achieving and sustaining high levels of
compliance are necessary but insufﬁcient conditions for the credibility
of forest practices systems; the system must, as with other natural
resource governance arrangements, be seen as legitimate3 (sensu
McDermott 2012; Wallington et al., 2008) to enjoy public conﬁdence
and trust. This is particularly difﬁcult to achieve in systems that are
based on a co-regulatory approach, such as Tasmania's, which are
open to criticism of regulatory capture (e.g. Hollander, 2006). We dis-
cuss below how key elements of building credibility and trust have
and might continue to be addressed in the Tasmanian context, at each
of the operational, system and institutional levels.
7.1. Operational level
A co-regulatory forest practices system depends fundamentally for its
success on the commitment and cooperation of forest owners, managers
andworkers. Engendering a positive attitude to the forest practices system
amongst these groups, and a culture of ongoing innovation and improve-
ment in delivering its objectives, is the foundationof achieving the environ-
mental protection goals of the system. The evidence from Tasmania
suggests that, whilst this element of an effective forest practices system
has largely been achieved through ongoing education and training for
those fully or regularly engaged in forest management or operations, it re-
mains difﬁcult to engender a sufﬁcient level of knowledge andunderstand-
ing amongst small-scale forest owners whose forests are subject to only
infrequent operations, and who may also see regulations for forest opera-
tions as an unreasonable constraint on their land use and proﬁtability
(Productivity Commission, 2004).
In the Australian context, this situation has parallels in the chal-
lenges of public education about bushﬁres, as severe ﬁres typically
occur only infrequently at any particular geographic location. Education
campaigns about bushﬁres have received considerable attention in
Australia (e.g. Kanowski et al., 2005), andmay be relevant to landowner
education about forest practices. It is also the case that the ﬁnancial
costs of compliance with the forest practices system are typically pro-
portionally greater for small-scale forest owners, a situation analogous
to that of forest certiﬁcation; as for certiﬁcation (e.g. Auld et al., 2008;
Butterﬁeld et al., 2005), reducing cost barriers to small-scale forest
owners is an important factor in fostering their willingness to partici-
pate most effectively in the forest practices system.
7.2. System level
At the level of the regulatory system itself, effective and transparent
processes of compliance monitoring and public reporting are funda-
mental to establishing and maintaining public credibility and trust. In
the Tasmanian case, the FPA's monitoring strategy and its annual com-
pliance reporting to parliament, are the principle means of fostering
public conﬁdence in the forest practices system. Similar independent
monitoring and reporting have been implemented in the Australian
state of Victoria (Department of Sustainability and Environment,
2012), but not in the other Australian states and territories (Smethurst
et al., 2012). The ultimate use of punitive measures, such as ﬁnes and
legal proceedings, is a necessary part of establishing the credentials of
a regulatory system; the Tasmanian experience suggests that invoking
these measures as part of the regulatory tool-kit does lead to changed
behaviour and improved compliance.
Market-based mechanisms to improve forest management and com-
municate its quality, through forest certiﬁcation, are also important
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legitimacy of the regulatory system. However, to date, having 76% of its
wood production forests certiﬁed under the PEFC-accredited Australian
Forest Certiﬁcation Scheme has had little evident impact on public
attitudes to forest policies and practices in Tasmania. As a result, the
Tasmanian government and forest industry have recently made a com-
mitment to seek FSC certiﬁcation for Tasmania's public wood production
forests (Australian Government, 2011), in the hope that the greater
emphasis of the FSC on stakeholder consultationwill better address issues
related to the social acceptability of forest policies and practices. Recent
amendments to the Forest Practices Act explicitly require the FPA to
review the Forest Practices Code in a manner that is consistent with this
objective (Parliament of Tasmania, 2013).
7.3. Institutional level
At the institutional level, the legitimacy of the entity overseeing the
forest practices system is paramount. In the initial years of the forest
practices system, the principal concern was legitimacy with the forest
industry; thiswas reﬂected in the composition and institutional location
of the initial Forest Practices Board within the state forestry agency. As
the system evolved andmatured, greater weight was given to legitima-
cy of the forest practices system in the broader public domain, and both
independence from vested interests and representativeness of the
diversity of interests in forest management were recognised as funda-
mental (e.g. Green, 2004; Futureye, 2004). Consequently, the establish-
ment of an independent Authority reporting to parliament has been
recognised as a necessary condition for strengthening public conﬁdence
and trust in the forest practices system. Until the establishment in 2005
of an independent authority governed by a skills-based Board, gover-
nance arrangements for the forest practices systemwere open to asser-
tions and perceptions of pro-industry bias (e.g. WWF Australia, 2004).
Establishing a greater level of public understanding about the FPA's
roles and responsibilities, andwhere the limits of those lie, are also nec-
essary (Russell et al., 2010), but have been more difﬁcult to achieve in
the highly-contested political and social contexts of Tasmanian forestry.
7.4. Conclusions
The major forest policy changes currently underway in Tasmania
(Australian Government, 2011) are intended to greatly diminish the
extent of social conﬂict over native forest management, largely by greatly
increasing the area of native forest reserved fromharvesting and reducing
the allowable cut from remaining forests. However, one perverse out-
come associated with increasing the polarisation of forest management
into either protected forests orwoodproduction zones (sensu ‘land apart-
heid’ — Lindenmayer, 2008) is that it can lead to an intensiﬁcation of tim-
ber harvesting regimes within wood production forests, which can
exacerbate, rather than diminish, public concern about forest practices
(Wilkinson, 2011; Tasmanian Conservation Trust, 2013). Nevertheless,
these changes and their consequences should help differentiate and clar-
ify policy and regulatory roles and responsibilities in Tasmanian forestry,
and – in turn – enhance the legitimacy of both forestry operations and the
forest practices system that governs them.
The Tasmanian forest practices system offers an informative case
study of a co-regulatory system. The key to its effective operation is the
FPOs, who have the powers to certify operations, report on compliance
and take action to enforce the rules as required. The potential conﬂicts
of interest of the self-regulatory FPO system are transparently managed
through the statutory monitoring and enforcement powers of the FPA
as the independent regulator. The emphasis of the FPA and its precursors
on training, education, monitoring and corrective actions as the primary
tools for achieving and maintaining high standards of compliance has
been demonstrably effective in improving compliance with forest prac-
tices requirements, but the importance of punitive measures as a fall-
back is also evident. The fundamental importance of establishinglegitimacy for forest practices systems, through independent and repre-
sentative governance arrangements, is evident from the Tasmanian
case; so too are the challenges of doing so in strongly contested political
and social contexts. As noted above, current changes to forest policy and
institutional arrangements in Tasmania should lead to further clariﬁcation
of the roles of the forest practices regulator, and enhance its legitimacy—
although there is also potential for the converse.
Nevertheless, the results of the analyses we report here, revealing
high levels of compliance since the Tasmanian forest practices system
became fully established, suggest that well-designed and implemented
co-regulatory approaches, with high levels of transparency, can be ef-
fective in fostering achievement of forest practices standards. Further
analysis, focusing on the effectiveness of the forest practices system in
delivering acceptable social, economic and environmental outcomes
rather than just on levels of compliance, would offer further insights
into the utility of the Tasmanian forest practices system and the
learnings that can be drawn from it.
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